Stuff I Wrote Elsewhere: Mr. Smith Goes to Washington

I had the distinct privilege yesterday of sitting down with my ABQJournal Washington bureau colleague Mike Coleman (the sitting was virtual – Coleman was in DC) and penning a quick look at Jeff Bingaman’s remarkable career (sub/ad req) on the occasion of his announcement that he will not run for a sixth term in the US Senate.

We open with the signing ceremony for the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which Bingaman wrote:

When the big moment came, though, you had to look hard to find Bingaman in the ceremonial crowd — behind Bush, behind the other dignitaries, standing in the back, a shy grin on his face.

“He’s got the lowest ego quotient of just about any senator I’ve ever run into,” said Robert Simon, head staffer for the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the longtime Bingaman aide who helped craft the 2005 energy bill.

I know, I know, people say stuff like that at times like this. The thing is, I’ve covered Bingaman for 20 years, and I can tell you Simon knows whereof he speaks.

On Evil Genius and Melting Icecaps

Cecil Adams goes through the thought experiment of how an Evil Genius might melt Earth’s icecaps, discarding one idea after another until landing on this:

See how this grabs you. We come up with a process that traps energy in the atmosphere rather than letting it radiate away, perhaps involving an accumulation of gases such as carbon dioxide or methane that would be transparent to incoming solar radiation but a barrier to surface heat. Sort of a, you know, greenhouse effect.

The beauty of this scheme is that once the heat built up to a certain point, cascading events would take you the rest of the way. Melting ice would release additional carbon dioxide and methane trapped within, accelerating warming. Thawing permafrost would release still more CO2, and if the oceans got toasty enough you could end up with a major release of frozen methane on the seabed, a process thought to have caused the Great Permian Extinction.

The problem from a cinematic standpoint is that no one genius, however evil, could pull this stunt off. The only way to generate enough CO2 would be combustion on a staggering scale-you’d need to enlist the bulk of the earth’s population in a decades-long campaign to burn through a significant fraction of the planet’s organic materials. Even if the plan were technically feasible, nobody would buy it as a movie premise.

Everybody pitches in to melt ice caps? Come on, you think we’re all fools?

Scientific Literacy

It’s hard to know whether this glass is half full or half empty:

US Science Literacy

US Science Literacy

It’s from “The Conceptualization and Measurement of Civic Scientific Literacy for the Twenty-First Century,” Jon Miller’s chapter in the new American Academy of Arts and Science report, “Science and the Educated American: A Core Component of Liberal Education.” (pdf here)

Miller has been trying to get empirical about the question of what Americans know and don’t know about science. As a science journalist trying to communicate with a broad lay audience, it is, for example, useful for me to remember that just 54 percent of Americans know that electrons are smaller than atoms. (Hey, that’s good news! It’s up from 46 percent a decade ago!) Having some feel for audience pre-knowledge is a critical piece of negotiating the space between science and the lay public, and between me and my audience.

The most recent data is important for a couple of reasons.

First, it suggests that the widespread belief that America is “dumbing down” is wrong. Miller’s repeat surveys, going back to the late 1980s in work done for the National Science Foundation, show a steady increase in public scientific literacy. But despite the steady improvement, most people just don’t know much about science.

It is common to hear the argument that, if only our educational system did a better job (or if only the media did a better job of teaching science), then outcomes of science-based political and public policy debates would improve. This data, which I’ve been using to help guide and inform my data since I discovered in the early 1990s, has always suggested to me that we’re never going to get far enough up that curve to make a big difference in those political and policy debates, and that we rather need processes that are robust to the reality that most folks just won’t ever know much science.

Environmental Flows in Tucson

Chris Brooks writes about the tension in Tucson between the use of sewage effluent for environmental flows and other uses. Tucson is in a very different situation from Albuquerque, where the effluent from Albuquerque’s sewage treatment plan is returned to a flowing Rio Grande, and is accounted as “return flows”, used to offset Albuquerque’s water consumption in the state’s Byzantine water accounting system. In other words, it’s already accounted for, and while it may provide “environmental flows”, that’s incidental to its use as supply for those downstream.

In Tucson, Chris describes an effort underway to use 10,000 acre feet per year of water for environmental flows, which is running into opposition from development interests who believe it should instead be reserved to meet future development needs:

[T]his water belongs to the entities that generated the effluent (the city and the county), who are free to allocate it in ways they believe will best benefit the region. Clearly there was some discussion within the community when the decision was made to set aside this water for environmental restoration. I don’t remember any similar discussion when the decision was made to wipe out 90% of the riparian habitat in the region so that water could be provided for the growth of the community.

Turning the Desert Green

Via the satellite data analysis folks at Chelys, a view of what used to be called the “Colorado River delta”, which is now one of the great winter vegetable growing regions of North America. That’s the Salton Sea top left, the Imperial Valley and Calexico farming regions in the center, and the Gila and Colorado River bottomlands converging in the center right of the image.

Colorado Delta, from space

Colorado Delta, from space, courtesy Chelys

Sooner Or Later, Malthus Will Be Right

From Buttonwood:

Were Chinese oil consumption to reach US per capita levels, its demand would rise ninefold, while Indian consumption would have to go up 23-fold. That would push global oil demand up to 260 million barrels per day, compared with just under 90m barrels a day at present. Clearly, that’s not going to happen. But along the way, some combination of much higher prices, a setback to developing nation growth or a switch to alternative fuel sources might be needed; all of which could be very disruptive.

River Beat: Yo, Vegas – Bonus Water on the Way!

Lake Las Vegas

Lake Las Vegas, Oct. 2010

If all goes well weather wise over the next six weeks, the US Bureau of Reclamation will release a substantial slug of extra water in 2011 to help refill Lake Mead.

Thanks to a decent snow pack, there is currently a 71 percent chance that the big reservoirs on the Colorado, Mead and Powell, will be operated in “equalization” status this year. That means an extra release from Lake Powell that, if things hold up, will be the largest since 1998 (11.5 million acre feet). That would leave Lake Mead’s elevation at 1,105 feet above sea level at the end of the water year Sept. 30, 21 feet above a year earlier.

Worth noting: The release is more than 3 million acre feet above the Upper Basin’s Colorado River Compact-required release. But storage in Lake Mead will only increase by 2 million acre feet, because of the Lower Basin’s propensity to use lots of water no matter what. (See here for previous discussion of the overdraft problem.)

The final decision on release plans is done in early April, based on the April 1 snow pack and accompanying runoff forecast.

Source: USBR February 2011 24-month study (pdf)

Running out of Water

A new Stockholm Environmental Institute analysis of water supply and demand in the Southwestern United States suggests we’re screwed.

In the U.S. Southwest – Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah – there is less rain and snowfall each year than the amount of water used in the region. Today that shortfall is made up for by pumping groundwater, well beyond the sustainable rate. Add the impacts of growing population and incomes, and the Southwest will face a major water crisis in the coming decades.

But you already knew that, right? So what’s new here?

Boulder Bay, Lake Mead, Oct. 2010

Boulder Bay, Lake Mead, Oct. 2010

I’ll stick my neck out here and argue that despite the paper’s title – “Climate Change and the Southwestern Water Crisis” – the new study’s most important finding may be that the climate change is a relatively minor player in the region’s future water problems, relative to the underlying supply-demand dynamic.

Much of the reporting the last few days has focused on the report’s dire analysis of the scale of the problem (see especially Bryan Walsh and Felicity Barringer’s nice job tying the SEI work in to a related new study on California groundwater depletion). Central to their argument is the fact that we’re using more water each year here in the southwest than nature provides, and we’re closing the supply-demand gap by mining groundwater. That’s the brickbat part of the study. But there are a couple of points that I think are worth drawing out in more detail.

The first is the connection between climate change and the underlying supply-demand problem. The authors, Frank Ackerman and Elizabeth Stanton, first calculate the supply and demand imbalance without climate change, assuming only baseline population and income growth and existing available resources. Given those assumptions, we would use 1.8 billion acre feet of water over the next century in excess of that supplied by nature, a number so staggeringly large, even for people used to thinking about big water numbers, as to be almost meaninglessly beyond comprehension.

Add in climate change (they run a couple of different emissions scenarios), and we need another 300 million to 450 million-plus acre feet. But three quarters of the problem is independent of climate change.

This is a critical point in terms of the political dynamic surrounding climate change and water in the southwest. The west’s water problems are frequently framed as a climate change problem – because of  climate change, we have a water problem. Which is true. But the political dynamic surrounding climate change creates huge problems here because of the widespread climate change skepticism afoot in the land. As long as the water problem is framed as a climate change problem, then skepticism of climate change can translate into skepticism of a water problem. (Doug Kenney’s new report on Colorado River governance (pdf) has some great data from a survey of Colorado River Water Users Association that lends support to my intuition on this point.)

I would argue that Ackerman and Stanton have shown that the scale of the problem is, to first order, the same with or without climate change. 1.8 billion or 2.25 billion acre feet shortfall? Whatever, let’s get cracking!

Which is the second useful part of the analysis. OK, we’ve got a huge problem, what can be done about it?

They suggest four potential paths forward:

  1. increase supply (not likely, they argue, on anything approaching the scale needed)
  2. more groundwater pumping (what we’ve done to date, but it can’t go on forever, as the resource is finite)
  3. planned reductions in use
  4. unplanned reductions in use (eek! the pain!)

Not surprisingly, Ackerman and Stanton suggest “3” as the preferable option. Agriculture currently uses 78 percent of the Southwest’s water, while making up less than 2 percent of the region’s economy. So they argue for an orderly, planned shift from ag to municipal and industrial use:

Farming supports just 1 percent of the Southwest?s economy, and food production manufactures add another 0.8 percent of GDP. Even in California, farming plus food manufactures accounts for only 1.9 percent of state GDP. But agriculture uses 78 percent of all Southwest water, and more water will be required as temperatures grow with climate change. Extensive agricultural adaptation cannot remove all need for conservation and efficiency measures in and around Southwest homes, but it can greatly reduce the need for urban adaptation while providing an important safety net against water shortages and restrictions in dry years.

Which is both important (given the contribution offered by the rigor of their analysis and modeling) and unsurprising. A struggle over the inevitability of ag-urban transfers has long been at the heart of the western dialogue. But this begs the question of how we might accomplish this in a planned vs. unplanned way.

(h/t Keith Kloor for bringing the study to my attention)

Markets in Everything*: Beatification

Barro and McCleary get to the bottom of one of the central questions in 21st-century economics – beatification:

We classify these blessed persons regionally in accordance with residence at death. These data are combined with time-series estimates of regional populations of Catholics, broadly-defined Protestants, Orthodox, and Evangelicals (mostly a sub-set of Protestants). Regression estimates indicate that the canonization rate depends strongly on the number of candidates, gauged by a region’s stock of beatifieds who have not yet been canonized. The beatification rate depends positively on the region’s stock of persons previously canonized.

* MIE meme stolen from Tyler Cowan and Alex Tabarrok