Risks of 2016 Colorado River shortage declaration pretty much gone, risks of 2017 also shrinking

The Bureau of Reclamation’s latest 24-month study, out this afternoon (pdf), shows continued improvement on the Colorado River system’s big reservoirs as a result of the hella rainy spring and summer, and therefore a continued reduction in the risk of a Lower Basin shortage declaration.

the May precipitation anomalies that bailed out the Colorado

the May precipitation anomalies that bailed out the Colorado

The number to watch is a Lake Mead elevation of 1,075, and the date to watch is January 1. The forecast in the latest 24-month study puts us at 1,082.12 on Jan. 1, 2016. That means that unless something crazy happens, like El Chapo’s tunnel dudes drill a hole in the bottom of Hoover Dam and steal 700,000 acre feet of water, it looks like a 2016 shortage declaration is completely off the table.

For 2017, things are also looking better. The current 24-month forecast puts it at 1,078.13 on Jan. 1, 2017, three feet above the danger line. That’s the midpoint of the forecast, meaning that there’s a better than 50-50 chance we won’t have a shortage in 2017. Three feet is not much, so the risk is clearly non-zero. The Bureau’s been running more sophisticated probability analyses, but I haven’t seen them, so I don’t know what the numbers say.

Matt Weiser leading new California drought news platform

A new California water/drought news site with former Sacramento Bee water beat reporter Matt Weiser as its managing editor is self-recommending. Here’s matt at Water Deeply on El Niño:

Current predictions for the winter ahead suggest El Niño will be a “borderline-strong” event, Null said.

It’s true, a strong El Niño, as measured by temperature change in the ocean, does seem more likely to produce wet winters. But it is not enough reason to start building that new swimming pool.

There have been only four strong El Niños in the past 65 years. Two of those led to a wet winter. The other half were drier than average.

Another U.S.-Mexico water agreement

Via Sandra Dibble:

The United States and Mexico are preparing to sign an agreement to address issues of sediment, trash and polluted stormwater that for years have plagued the Tijuana River watershed.

The binding agreement, known as a minute, aims to set up a framework to formally address the issues bilaterally and bring together members of government agencies as well as participants from the nonprofit sector. Under the minute, groups are expected to address three major issues: sediment control, solid waste management and water quality.

Water in the desert: Crownpoint, New Mexico

Near Crownpoint, McKinley County, New Mexico, by L. Heineman

Near Crownpoint, McKinley County, New Mexico, by L. Heineman

Crownpoint, New Mexico, is one of those places that makes clear the extent to which water (or its lack) constrains human geography.

Lissa and I drove out Friday evening to the monthly Crownpoint Navajo Rug Auction. Crownpoint’s the biggest city on the eastern edge of the Navajo Nation, but at a population of 2,500, it’s small. The embrace of an unbelievably green desert right now is striking (today is the ninth consecutive day with rain at our house, which I think is a record since I began tracking in 1999), but make no mistake – this is the desert. Place names around here are a testimony to longing for water – Littlewater, Mariano Lake, Casamera Lake, Smith Lake.

If you read two books about the West’s water problems, one of them probably shouldn’t be Cadillac Desert.

We need to create a #WestWaterSyllabus.

Mark Hertsgaard at the Daily Beast got a lot of traction this weekend with a piece suggesting this: If You Only Read One Book About the Water Crisis: ‘Cadillac Desert. If we’re going to have a #WestWaterSyllabus, there’s no question Cadillac Desert has to be on it, but making it the only thing we read is problematic. Hertsgaard’s piece demonstrates how it constrains our understanding of the problem in a way that also constrains our understanding of what the solutions might look like.

"Nobel Prize 2009-Press Conference KVA-30" by © Holger Motzkau 2010, Wikipedia/Wikimedia Commons (cc-by-sa-3.0). Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons - https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nobel_Prize_2009-Press_Conference_KVA-30.jpg#/media/File:Nobel_Prize_2009-Press_Conference_KVA-30.jpg

Elinor Ostrom, Nobel Prize 2009-Press Conference KVA-30 by © Holger Motzkau 2010, Wikipedia/Wikimedia Commons (cc-by-sa-3.0). Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons

So if you only have time for two books, I’d suggest a second, less well known effort: Elinor Ostrom’s Governing the Commons. But whatever you do, I’d really warn against stopping with Cadillac Desert.

Asked some years ago about suggested readings to understand California water, OtPR wrote one of the best explanations I’ve seen of Cadillac Desert’s proper place:

Read Cadillac Desert for an understanding of how things were thirty years ago.  It isn’t accurate now (in fact, the book made itself obsolete), but Cadillac Desert fundamentally shaped the lay view of water in CA.  When a layperson has some outraged simplistic solution to water problems in CA, it’ll be from Cadillac Desert, so it is good to understand where they are coming from.

Cadillac Desert remains so popular because Reisner was a hell of a writer, and he tells a hell of a tale, a story that’s populated with greed and bad guys that makes for an easy-to-grasp narrative structure that has dominated our understanding of western water ever since. So read it, if for no other reason than it’s a great read and everyone you talk to will also likely have read it.

It is, as Hertsgaard suggests, a powerful book with a central message: “The current drought out West only underscores a problem entirely of our own making: for too long we have rigged the price of water to benefit a favored few.”

But the Western water historian Norris Hundley, in his California water history The Great Thirst (oh dear, we’re already up to three? and it’s a really long book!) suggests we need a more nuanced understanding of the evolution of our problems:

More compelling explanations are found in a compound of interest-group pressures, local and regional considerations, political trade-offs, and the larger context of American political culture in which the national culture and its reverberations within California help explain actions that may otherwise be incorrectly attributed to a conspiratorial power elite.

Which means that rather than hunting for bad guys and easy fixes, or maybe in addition to it, we need a nuanced understanding of the efforts made by human communities to engage in this messy task of collective governance of common-pool resources. Enter Ostrom.

Governing the Commons is not primarily a “Western water” book. But its discussion of the evolution of water management institutions in Southern California, and the generalizations that follow about what does and does not work, offers a critical piece that Reisner leaves out. Reisner’s all about our failings. Ostrom points out that people do, in fact, successfully riddle their way through collective management of a shared resource, and how does that happen? I’d been dabbling in water journalism for 20 years, steeped in the Reisner narrative, when I first tumbled to Ostrom’s work. It was a head-smacking “I wish I’d read this sooner” time for me.

In the 30 years since Cadillac Desert, there’s been plenty of bad guy stuff (Hertsgaard is right to call out California’s Westlands Water District, which is a textbook case of what the economists dryly call “rent-seeking behavior“). But there has been a great deal of the sort of collaborative problem solving Ostrom talks about as well in the 30 years since Cadillac Desert, problem solving that has substantially lessened the bite of the current drought and substantially improved the resilience of the communities that depend on the West’s overtaxed rivers and aquifers. It’s problem solving that Reisner’s work did not anticipate and cannot help us understand.

Someone should write another book about that.

UC team: California ag “positioned to weather this drought”

The latest analysis by a University of California team has concluded (pdf) that agriculture in that state is doing pretty well in the current drought, all things considered:

The current drought is causing large economic losses but given innovative responses by farmers and others, those losses have been manageable and California agriculture is positioned to weather this drought.

Losses are big: $1.8 billion in a $45 billion California ag economy, or 4 percent. Agricultural employment continues to grow, but not as quickly as it would otherwise have in the absence of drought:

[L]abor-intensive agriculture has, in fact, been growing, and job growth would have been larger, but for the continuing drought.

With ripple effects through the economy, the UC team estimates a total impact of $2.7 billion, which is a drought impact of a bit more than one tenth of one percent of California’s $2.1 trillion (source) economy.

Where has the adaptive capacity come from?

Adaptation methods include changing the typical crop mix by using water for crops with higher revenue per unit of water, substituting groundwater for surface water, water transfers, and additional use of technology.

One of these in particular, the authors note, poses risks that may be providing adaptive capacity now at the expense of adaptive capacity in the future:

[C]ontinuous overdraft of groundwater, a fast-growing proportion of permanent crops, and the use of irrigation systems that minimize recharge reduce the ability to cope with future droughts.

Californians need to do something about that.

The report is Economic Impact of the 2015 Drought on Farm Revenue and Employment, by Richard E. Howitt, Josué Medellín-Azuara, Duncan MacEwan, Jay R. Lund, and Daniel A. Sumner (pdf)

 

Can we retire “Water flows uphill toward money”?

I’ve come to the conclusion that the whole “water flows uphill toward money” thing is not only wrong, but that its wrongness is problematic.

It’s one of those intellectual shortcuts that can be dashed off uncritically, and audiences nod knowingly because of course water flows uphill toward money we all know that, and no further analysis is needed. Sometimes this is right. But across a huge range of water allocation decision making, it is utterly wrong. While “water sometimes flows uphill toward money, while at other times it doesn’t, and we should think carefully about why it is or isn’t the case here” might be more analytically useful, it lacks the rhetorical punch.

Why is this?

Rules. We have water allocation rules that frequently create barriers that make it difficult, if not impossible, to move water, even if the move might be hydrologically possible. I’m not arguing here that this is good or bad. I’m merely trying to point out that “water flows uphill to money” is a myth, and that it gets in the way of sane water policy conversations.

I’ve been tracing back the history of the phrase for my book, and looking at its myth and reality in the Colorado River Basin, but I’ll save that for another time. Let me instead explain by way  of a crisp example on the Rio Grande here in New Mexico.

Southern New Mexico chiles, by John Fleck

Southern New Mexico chiles, by John Fleck

Consider this Albuquerque Journal story last week from Ollie Reed. First is a comment from David Gensler, who manages the water supply for the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, which delivers farm water to Rio Grande Valley farmers in the central part of the state: “Right now the outlook for farmers is pretty good.” That’s been pretty consistent. While there have been some shortfalls in recent years, Gensler and his farmers have limped by with most of the water they needed most years. Meanwhile downstream, Phil King’s outlook for farmers on New Mexico’s southern Rio Grande (the same river) remains dismal:

“The last five years have been so pathetic that we now have really low standards and this year looks good,” King said. “You can’t have the worst year ever every year. But we are still a long way from average.”

Annual agricultural production down south, where King’s farmers are wrestling with shortage, is roughly $7,000 per acre, with big dollar crops like pecans, onions, and chiles. Up here in the middle valley, where Gensler’s farmers are fat and happy, it’s about $3,500 per acre.* That’s pretty much the opposite of water flowing uphill toward money. When I was doing drought reporting for the newspaper, I would hear this all the time from southern New Mexico farmers, glaring at the farmers up north and muttering about how they seem to have all the water they need and what are they growing with it, just alfalfa?

The rules in this case involve the Rio Grande Compact, which sets a boundary between these two parts of the river across which it is physically possible but legally quite difficult to move water. It is legally impossible for a farmer up here and a farmer down there, a willing seller and a willing buyer, to do a deal so the water could flow uphill toward all that pecan and chile money.

I intentionally picked an ag-to-ag comparison here to avoid letting this slip into a “farms versus cities” argument. The ag-urban contrast is more common. Our cities are a big, rich, muscle-bound part of our economy, the farms are just a small percentage, yet the farms have most of the water. There are plenty of exceptions, plenty of interesting and important cases where the alternative is true, that water moved toward the money (think Owens Valley or the vastly expensive Central Arizona Project where the water’s quite literally flowing uphill at great expense). But there are also tons of cases where it hasn’t happened, and thinking through the differences is important.

* Author’s calculations based on income data from the U.S. Department of Commerce and acreage data from the two irrigation districts